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INTRODUCTION
China's foreign trade has played an essential role in 
the economic reform launched 12 years ago in 1978.’ The 
ambitious economic reform programs require tremendous foreign 
currency. More than 80% of the foreign currency in China 
comes from export.^ About $27 billion was spent on import 
of the advanced foreign technology and equipment since 1978, 
and nearly 60% of the net increase in China's national income 
during this period was due to import and export activity.^ 
Because of the importance of foreign trade in China's 
economy, continuous studies have been conducted by scholars 
and students of business in this area in order to provide 
implications for U.S. trade policy towards China. The 
purpose of this paper, therefore, is to analyze the problems 
in China's foreign trade system, to explore the policy issues 
in reforming that system, and to make some predictions about 
future prospects in China's foreign trade.
The reform in the foreign trade system has really lagged 
behind the pace of reform in other areas. The foreign trade 
organizations were strongholds of economic planning, yet were 
among the very last to reform themselves. One event in 
particular, the suppression of the pro-democracy movement in 
June of 1989, has cast a great shadow on China's foreign 
trade reforms launched in the beginning of 1988 by the now-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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ousted Party chief Zhao Ziyang.^ Why has it been so hard to 
reform the foreign trade system? What changes would reform 
bring to China's foreign trade system if it had gone through? 
What impact would it have on the nation ' s economy? These are 
the questions this paper will attempt to answer.
To intelligently discuss the current state of China's 
foreign trade, we first need a brief review of its history. 
Some authors have preferred to go back to the time long 
before the establishment of the People's Republic.^ This, 
of course, provides a broader historical background of China 
as a nation, but the reality is that this nation was 
separated at the time of Mao's revolution and the two parts 
of China adopted totally different systems. In order to 
maintain focus and vigor, this paper will concentrate on 
mainland China after the Communist Party took power: the
history starting with the founding of the People's Republic 
in 1949. China's foreign trade in historical perspective is 
covered by Chapter one.
Chapter two also provides background historical material, 
but focuses upon a second post-revolution phase: the post- 
Cultural Revolution period of 1976 to 1990. The Chinese 
society has undergone a tremendous change since the Cultural 
Revolution. The "open door" policy has brought in ideas and 
concepts that used to be absolutely forbidden, such as the 
concept of free enterprise. The meeting of western and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
eastern cultures and the mixture of the socialist and 
capitalist practices have caused great confusion among the 
Chinese people and their leaders. This chapter describes the 
complicated environment of China's social, economic, 
cultural, political, and legal factors, centering on the 
economic reform which gave rise to the long-awaited reform 
in the foreign trade system.
Chapters three and four cover the central topics of the 
paper: the structure of foreign trade organizations and
policy issues in foreign trade. The structural changes in 
Chinese foreign trade are extremely important —  the change 
from centralization to decentralization and from 
specialization to diversification. Without such changes, 
the competition mechanism can not be brought into this giant 
machine, and without competition there will never be any 
vitality injected into the many bureaucratized trade 
organizations. Discussion of other important issues such as 
the composition of commodities, the management of foreign 
investment and foreign financing, the trade between U.S. and 
China, necessarily follows. Based on these facts and 
analysis, the future prospects of China's foreign trade are 
discussed. Following Chapter four is the summary and 
conclusion of the foregoing four chapters' discussions from 
the author's perspective.
As the nature of this paper is non-experimental, the data
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collected are secondary —  mainly from the newly published 
China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Year Book —  
1989. compiled by a government commission headed by the 
minister of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, Zheng 
Tuobin. Statistics from other sources are also taken into 
consideration in the analyses.
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Chapter 1
CHINA»S FOREIGN TRADE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
In 1988, China's total imports and exports amounted to 
$79.4 billion, according to the statistics from the Ministry 
of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT)This was 
a dramatic 285% increase over 1978 foreign trade. The 
average growth rate was above 16%, far surpassing the average 
growth rate of the world's total trade.^ This growth rate 
made China the twelfth biggest country in external trade in 
the world.
Even in 1989, a year with enormous political turmoil in 
Beijing, the total import and export value still reached 
$81.15 billion. Exports were $43.128 billion —  an increase 
of 6.5% from that of the previous year. Imports totalled 
$38.127 billion —  a decrease of 3.9% from that of 1988.®
Yet the history of China's foreign trade since the 
founding of the new People's Republic in 1949, was far from 
being so impressive. The new government tried to establish 
her foreign trade system immediately after it took power from 
the National Party's government that fled to Taiwan. There 
were many obstacles ahead. The major external obstacle was 
the embargo of the new People's Republic of China by the
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6
western countries. At that time most of the western 
countries didn't recognize the new China, therefore it didn't 
have many trading partners even if China wanted to develop 
her foreign trade. The major internal obstacle was 
ideological; "self-sufficiency" and "self-reliance" were the 
fundamental principles of the new government's policy. Under 
this guiding policy, the foreign trade that the new 
government was willing to engage in could only be between 
communist countries.
Major business in the '50s was conducted solely with 
China's "big brother"—  the Soviet Union, who provided loans 
and technical assistance to China in the first ten years 
until relations were broken off in 1959. Because of the 
ideological and political disputes arising later between the 
Russian and Chinese Communist Party, especially between the 
two leaders Khrushchev and Mao, the Soviet loan was almost 
halted in 1957 after Mao's visit to Moscow, and the 
relationship began to become worse at the end of the decade. 
The Soviet loans to China during the First Five Year Plan 
period (1950-1955) came to $1.4 billion. After, this period, 
the repayments of loans exceeded the new credits.®
The leading policy for China's foreign trade was, as the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade (MOFT) put it, "Exports are for 
imports, and imports are for the country's 
industrialization." Under this policy, equipment, machinery, 
technology, and even whole plants were introduced to China
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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from the Soviet Union and other eastern block countries. 
This importation helped the new China establish a primary 
basis of her industry after years of wars. In 1959, China 
achieved an import and export value of $4-38 billion, and 
half of this amount was with Soviet Union. The ratio of 
foreign trade to national income was about 12%.̂ °
The termination of the Party relations with the Soviet 
Union marked the beginning of another period of China's 
foreign trade. Trade with eastern block countries dropped 
precipitously. Trade with other developing countries and a 
handful western countries was sparse. The three years 
"natural disaster" —  caused by a setback in grain production 
and bad weather, brought unbearable famine to the Chinese 
people from 1960 to 1962. The grain production fell below 
150 million tons to about three quarters of the 1957 level 
of production.” The government had to further reduce export 
of agricultural products and to import food to feed the 
hungry. In 1962, import and export value dropped to $2.66 
billion, down about 50% from 1959's total. The ratio of 
foreign trade to national income dropped to about 8%.̂ ^
After 1962, the economy began to reverse a little. This 
brought about a reversal in foreign trade. In these few 
years, China began to do more business with non-communist 
countries, even with Japan —  a traditional enemy without 
diplomatic relations. China resumed import of machinery and 
plants, though on a small scale. And the government was
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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trying to expand foreign trade to boost the economy, but had 
great difficulty. It had to heal the wounds from the recent 
natural disasters as well as to repay all loans from the 
Soviet Union (with final payments in 1965).
Leftist ideology and the power struggle within the Party, 
compounded by long term isolation from the world, resulted 
in the Cultural Revolution in 1966. Mao launched this mass 
movement in order to get rid of his major opponents in the 
Party led by Liu Shaoqi —  then President of the State, and 
to strengthen his own power base. This was easily achieved, 
but the movement became so massive that it went out of his 
own control. A renowned American scholar observed: "The
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was from any point of 
view one of the most bizarre events in history. To western 
observers it made China even more mysterious than usual. 
Something like one hundred million people were active 
participants in it, many of them as victims, while at least 
five hundred million can be said to have been significantly 
affected by it.
The damage of the Cultural Revolution to foreign trade 
was enormous. Efforts at expanding foreign trade in the 
preceding few years were disrupted, trade relations with a 
number of western countries were suspended, and the very idea 
of foreign trade was severely criticized and attacked by the 
radical Maoists. Imports and exports remained at about $4
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billion in the following five or six years, a decrease in 
real terms from 1959. Until 1971, the total import and 
export value came to $ 4.84 billion, only 5.8% of the
national income.
In 1971, China reentered the United Nations. After that 
year, China gradually established diplomatic relations with 
Japan, European countries, Australia, New Zealand, and other 
countries. It also resumed trade relations with the United 
States. In 1979, China established full diplomatic relations 
with the United States, marking a new era for China, an era 
ending thirty years of isolation, a reentrance into the world 
trading family. From then on were years exciting to many of 
the world countries doing business with China. One observer 
described the trade of this period as "exploding." Only in 
1978, "according to U.S. estimates, overall trade increased 
by close to 40% (in current prices), from about $15 billion 
(in 1977) to roughly $21 billion, with import (cost, 
insurance, freight) increasing by 56%, from $ 7.1 billion to 
$ 11.1 billion, and exports (free on board) rising 26%, from 
just under $8 billion to $11 billion.According to 
official Chinese statistics, this U.S. estimate was quite 
close. The import and export value for 1978 was $20.64 
billion, a 3.26% increase from that of 1971. This was the 
beginning of a new era of economic reform.
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Chapter 2
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT IN 10-YEAR REFORM
I. Laving The Political Foundation 
In order to initiate the 10-year economic reform, Deng 
Xiaoping had first to clear his political path. After the 
late Marshal Yie Jianying and Mao's appointed successor Hua 
Guofeng managed to put Mao's widow and three other leftist 
leaders in jail, Deng became vice premier. Step by step, 
Deng strengthened his power-base. The only thing he had to 
do was to get rid of Hua Guofeng, who was the Chairman of 
the Party. Hua insisted on two principles after Mao's death: 
"Whatever Mao says must be followed strictly; whatever policy 
was laid by Mao must be carried out thoroughly. Deng took 
this as a major weapon against Hua, and his position was 
reaffirmed in the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress 
at the end of 1 9 7 8 . In a matter of about three years, Deng 
made it clear to the nation and to the world, through the 
communique of the Fifth Plenum of the Eleventh Central 
Committee, that he was the number one man in the Party.
Deng's political philosophy was well embodied in one of 
his famous sayings: "Whether it's white or black, as long as 
it catches mice, it's a good cat." By catching mice, he 
clearly meant getting things done —  making China rich. To
10
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achieve this overall goal, he called for more freedom of both 
expression and creativity. But he also made it clear at the 
outset that this freedom was limited. It had to be in line 
with political unity and stability: it must not challenge his 
power nor the power of his Party. To clear the way for 
change, he pensioned off more than one million senior Party 
cadres. In September 1985, 131 high-ranking veterans
resigned. Generally they retained their perquisites as 
members of a new Central Advisory Commission of the Party 
headed by himself.^®
Deng came to power at a time when the Chinese economy 
was brought to the brink of collapse by the catastrophic 
Cultural Revolution. Economic recovery was therefore of 
preeminent importance both to the country and to Deng's 
political position. Deng knew very well that a healthy 
economy was essential for the consolidation of his power. 
With political power in hand and political tone set, Deng 
began to advocate his economic reform.
II. General Social Conditions 
After years of state manipulation of people's political 
ideology, loosening of such control and calls for the 
emancipation of the mind brought great changes in people's 
outlooks. With the restoration of the formal education 
system so disrupted and severely damaged during the cultural 
revolution, young people began to bury themselves in books
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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again to regain what had been lost. Entrepreneurs engaged 
in new ways of making money. Intellectuals were encouraged 
to do research and write papers and books. There were often 
lively public debates on what should be done for the economic 
reform. New cadres were recruited from those with higher 
education and Party loyalty. International reactions were 
positive. People began to see more and more foreign tourists 
visiting China. Many people resumed correspondence with 
their overseas relatives and family members that was cut off 
during the cultural revolution. The social conditions were 
indeed quite stable and people were full of hope. Reform 
began to spread in major fields of the economy.
Ill. Overview of Economic Reform 
In the post Mao-era, the issue of economic reform had 
received much publicity, but it was Deng Xiaoping’s policy 
of market economy mixed with administrative control that 
provided a solid foundation for economic recovery from the 
cultural revolution. His theorists termed it as an "economic 
system with China's socialist characteristics." They drew 
four policy conclusions from their analysis of administrative 
segmentation.
First, there should be greater separation between the 
spheres of administration and economics, the latter having 
more scope to operate according to its own organic logic. 
This implies the formation of natural economic zones crossing
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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administrative boundaries and the promotion of inter-plant 
integration, particularly through cross-boundary companies 
or associations. Secondly, central planning organs had to 
be strengthened to curb branch-based departmentalism and to 
establish a more rational division of labor between central 
and local departments. Central planners henceforth had to 
concentrate on macro-economic management, regulating the 
micro-economy less by directive means and more by economic 
levers or guidance methods. Thirdly, market processes were 
to be resuscitated, with a new ideological outlook 
recognizing the commoditized character of the socialist 
economy. Fourth, the bedrock of the reform programme, the 
decision-making autonomy of industrial enterprises, had to 
be expanded.^’
Agricultural Reform
The reform experiment first started in rural areas. Two 
policies were adopted to restructure and readjust the 
relationship between peasants and the production units. The 
first one was the redistribution of agrarian land. Under the 
condition that the land was still collectively owned, the 
land could be contracted in the form of lease to individual 
peasants. This practice gave peasants incentive to work hard 
on the land and laid the overall foundation for agricultural 
reform. The second policy was to increase the state 
purchasing price of agricultural products. In 1979, prices
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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were increased by 20.1%, and in 1980, another 8.1%. 
Consequently, incremental income for these two years was 46 
billion yuan (the unit of RMB̂ ° —  the Chinese currency)
With these two initial policies implemented, a series of 
measures were then introduced. The people's commune was 
previously a combination of local government and production 
units. This mixed creature was eliminated and the government 
was separated from the production units. This change enabled 
adoption of the responsibility system of joint contracting - 
- several peasants' households contracted for a piece of land 
and had the responsibility of remitting a certain portion of 
the products or profits to the state after the harvest at a 
pre-fixed purchasing price. This system applied not only 
to agricultural production but also to other associated 
businesses as well.
A second measure involved creation of a new purchasing 
policy for agricultural products. As the basis for 
readjusting state purchasing prices, prices for agricultural 
products were deregulated in 1985 (except for the portion 
retained to supply city residents). Thus, peasants began to 
have more autonomy in deciding what to do with the surplus 
left after state contracts were fulfilled. They could sell 
it on the free market or sell it to the state at a negotiated 
price. This was a great change from rigid planned economy 
to planned commodity economy.
A third measure entailed readjusting the structure of
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the agricultural enterprise and the composition of 
agricultural products, and encouraging the agrarian commodity 
economy. The state government allocated certain capital and 
loans to assist peasants in establishing private businesses. 
Many rural small scale factories, shops, services, schools 
were established, leading the rural economy to develop in 
the direction of specialization, commodization, and 
modernization.
Reform changed the outlook of the vast countryside in 
China. On the basis of 1980 prices, total agricultural output 
increased from 232.7 billion yuan in 1982 to 312.76 billion 
yuan in 1987 —  a growth rate of 6.2%, almost 100% greater 
than the growth rate of 3.22% in the 26 years prior to 1978. 
Crop output increased from 350 million metric tons in 1982 
to 400 million metric tons in 1 9 8 7 From 1984 on, crop 
output could basically satisfy the needs of 1 billion Chinese 
people.
The birth of rural enterprises changed the relation 
between the countryside and the cities; many rural areas 
became industrialized. In 1986, the total income of rural 
enterprises was 222.355 billion yuan —  32.31% of the total 
rural income and 11.73% of the national income.
Ownership Reform
The reform in ownership of production means was one of 
the boldest moves of this period. The reformers claimed that
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the country was still in the primary stage of socialism, the 
level of productivity was low, and that the development of 
the economy was not balanced. It was argued that, to boost 
the economy, the dominant form of ownership should be changed 
from single public ownership to a multi-person public 
ownership. In the meantime, management should be
distinguished and separated from ownership in publicly-owned 
enterprises. This would give the management more
responsibility and more say in running the business. Thus 
there appeared many different forms of management.
Management under contract and management under lease were 
the two major forms. Management under contract for medium 
and big sized enterprises proved to be especially successful. 
Contracting the right of managing the enterprise to one 
person or a group of people made contractually clear the 
responsibility, power, obligation and profit sharing between 
management and the state government. This was a new kind of 
management mechanism for the publicly-owned enterprises.
According to statistics, more than 80% of publicly-owned 
enterprises adopted this contracting management 
responsibility system in 1987. A survey of 2171 enterprises 
adopting this system indicated that productivity was 
increased by 9.4% between January and September of 1987 over 
figures for the same period of the previous year.^^ For state 
owned small enterprises and business, leasing was the main 
form of experimentation. Those businesses leased out were
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primarily the ones suffering losses. The lessee was usually 
selected from a group of ambitious individuals via bidding 
or public exam. These experiments demonstrated sharply 
increased economic benefits and most of the businesses turned 
out to be making a profit after leasing.
Foreign investment, joint ventures, and joint management 
were also new forms of ownership. The reformers argued that 
as China was still in the primary stage of socialism, the 
existence of national capitalism, semi-socialism, and 
complete capitalism would introduce competition and make the 
state-owned enterprises better-managed domestically and more 
competitive internationally. By the end of 1987, there were 
about 9000 such enterprises —  still a very small proportion 
in the economy.
Enterprise Autonomv
Strengthening the vitality of business enterprises was 
a major concern of city-based reform. To accomplish this, 
enterprises needed more autonomy and power. The state 
government took the following measures:
1) Enlarged production planning power: Enterprises could
decide their own production and new-product development 
planning according to the market demand, provided state 
planning was conformed with.
2) Enlarged buying and selling power: Enterprises could 
purchase raw material from the market according to their
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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production needs. Surplus products could be sold at will.
3) Enlarged pricing freedom: Along with more and more 
loosening of price regulations, enterprises could decide the 
prices for many products according to production costs and 
market demand.
4) Use of retained capital: Earnings retained by the 
enterprises have been growing year by year, from 3.7% in 1978 
to about 30% in 1982, and 40% in 1987. Concomitantly, the 
power of deciding how and where to use these retained 
earnings also increased greatly.
5) Distribution of wages and benefits: Only the government
could decide the aggregate amount of salaries and their 
growth rate. Enterprises would decide how to distribute 
increases among employees. Usually, salaries and bonuses 
were related to profit realized.
6) Parallel economic ventures : Enterprises could decide
whether they would like to have parallel ventures in 
different areas, different professions, different ownership, 
etc.
7) Personnel power: Enterprises could decide upon their own 
criteria for recruiting and also upon promotion and demotion 
of medium and/or lower lever managerial personnel.
Another important reform in this area was in labor 
salary. It was the first attempt to break the "iron rice 
bowl" —  the state guaranteed job, since the founding of the 
People's Republic of China. Many experiments were conducted
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to find out the most effective way of giving monetary 
incentive to employees in order to increase productivity. 
Efforts were made in associating bonuses with relevant 
economic responsibility.
Macro Economic Management,
The objective of the economic reform was to establish an 
economic system combining the advantages of a planned economy 
with the vitality of a market economy. Around this 
objective, the following measures were taken at the macro 
economic management level:
1) Planning System: The government reduced the scope of 
compulsory planning and decentralized the power of planning 
management in order to have more market force adjusting 
demand and supply. Approval of investment projects was also 
decentralized to a lower level of government. Projects of 
a non-manufacturing nature could be approved at provincial 
level. Complete return of investment was contracted to the 
relevant units for the sake of safety.
2) Financing system: The single state payment and 
reimbursement system was reformed to contract the budgeted 
amount to each level of government so that each had to manage 
financing carefully. Financing was no longer solely a state 
business. New forms of financing were also experimented 
with, such as public stock, joint management, credit loans, 
etc. Taxes took the place of turning in profits to the
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state, and new forms of taxes were created to function as an 
economic lever.
3) Monetary System; A new monetary system was established, 
with the central bank as the main body and many other 
monetary institutions supporting and cooperating, including 
investment and trust firms. The insurance business was 
resumed. In a few big cities there even appeared several 
primary securities markets.
Circulation And Price Svstem
Great efforts were made to develop a market system for 
a commodity economy. In order to achieve this, the old 
system of one channel purchasing, wholesaling, and retailing 
was changed. Primary and secondary wholesale shops directly 
administered by the Commerce Ministry were restructured to 
be administered by the commerce departments of the major 
cities, enlarging the autonomy of these state-owned commerce 
units. They had incentive to develop multi-channel buying 
and selling networks, the result many big trade center, 
shopping malls, and wholesaling markets. Also, private-owned 
business boomed like mushrooms after rain. These changes 
made consumers' lives much easier.
The major issue in price reform was the so called "two- 
tier" price system. This system was characterized by its 
supplementary regulatory role.^^ Instituted in 1984, the 
two-tier pricing system was designed so that for major
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production material such as crude oil, coal and steel, there 
was no longer a unified state-fixed price. The price was to 
be made into three categories —  fixed price, floating price, 
and market price. The fixed price was used for the quantity 
of the output within the state plan. The floating and market 
prices were used for surplus quantities. This policy was 
only applied to important industrial products. For consumer 
products and some of the agricultural products, the prices 
were gradually deregulated.
Reform In Cities
After initial success in the rural area, there were also 
experimental reforms in the cities. The major underlying 
idea was enabling cities to get rid of bureaucratic bondage 
and allowing for a functional atmosphere for organizing and 
managing. The major measures taken were the following:
1) The administrative power of all the functional areas were 
decentralized, the autonomy of all enterprises and businesses 
was enlarged.
2) In big and economically important cities, conglomerates 
no longer needed to affiliate with their provincial 
governments. They could make their own economic plans and 
budget directly with the state council, enjoying more freedom 
in implementing their economic strategies within the 
guidelines of government regulations.
3) Reform also touched municipal governments: they had to
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simplify the governmental hierarchy and make each department 
more professional and efficient. Their economic activities 
were also supposed to be supervised by the residents of the 
cities.
IV. Legal Conditions 
In order to manage the economy by means of law and to 
meet the requirements of the opening reform policy, the Sixth 
Convention of the National People's Congress^^ and its 
standing committee continued to give creation of economic law 
priority. In the past few years, most of the laws passed or 
submitted for examination by the People's Congress concerned 
the economy or the policy of opening to the outside world.
As early as 1981, The Law of Economic Contracts was drawn 
up. In April 1986, the General Civil Law was passed, a basic 
law adjusting the relations of the commodity economy. 
Injecting vitality into business enterprises has been a key 
link in the economic reform. The separation of ownership and 
management was therefore required by the reform, so as to 
give more power and initiative to the management of state- 
owned enterprises. The General Civil Law stipulated the 
regulations governing the enterprise legal person and gave 
the sole power of management to the enterprise. It also 
stipulated rules for joint-management between legal persons, 
promoting crosswise economic alliances between enterprises. 
Thm state-owned Industrial Enterprise Law (draft) defined the
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separation of ownership and management, including the 
responsibilities of the factory director. In December 1985, 
The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (tentative) was passed to 
promote independent management of the state-owned enterprises 
and to let them assume sole responsibility for their profits 
and losses. Meanwhile, the Statistics Law and the Accounting 
Law were also written to ensure central control and state 
supervision of all socioeconomic activities.^^
Laws were also made regarding the use and management of 
natural resources. Such laws like the Forestry Law, the 
Prairie Law, the Fishing Law, the Mineral Resource Law, the 
Land Management Law, the Water Law, and so on, were all basic 
laws addressing the use and management of various natural 
resources.
In order to ensure the proper implementation of the open- 
door policy, Laws were also formulated to govern all 
activities involving foreign nationals. Such laws include 
the Law for Economic Contracts with Foreign Nationals, the 
Law for Foreign Investment Enterprises, and the Law for Joint 
Venture Enterprises.
In the process of economic reform and opening to the 
outside world, new problems requiring immediate legal 
regulation frequently arose. Because China was inexperienced 
in legislative reform and there were circumstances where the
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conditions calling for legislation were as yet immature, the 
People's Congress authorized the State Council to make 
temporary rules and regulations for issues involved in 
economic reform and opening to the outside world, as long as 
such rules and regulations did not contradict the basic 
principles laid down by. the People's Congress and its 
Standing Committee.
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Chapter 3
THE STRUCTURE OF CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE ORGANIZATIONS
I. The Organization
China's foreign trade organizations were established in 
imitation of the Soviet model after the founding of the 
Peoples' Republic. The Ministry of Foreign Trade (MOFT) had 
the sole responsibility of planning, supervising, and 
implementing all the foreign trade businesses and activities. 
Because of the ideological concern over "self-sufficiency and 
self-reliance" and the fear of undue foreign influences, the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade was one of the most strictly 
controlled ministries, probably second only to the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs.
One of the most distinctive features of this organization 
is its dual structure of internal administrative control and 
external business management. It has three area policy 
bureaus in charge of Europe, Africa, and America and the 
Atlantic, as well as a dozen functional bureaus within itself 
in charge of functional divisions such import and export, 
international cooperation, foreign loan and foreign 
investment, quota and licenses, regulation and law, planning 
and financing, etc. Its overseas's organs are the commercial 
offices of the Chinese embassies in each country. Its
25
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
26
internal agencies outside the ministry itself are the foreign 
trade bureaus in each province, autonomous region, and the 
cities directly administered by the State Council. These 
agencies represent each level of government. From the 
administrative and personnel standpoints, they are part of 
the provincial government. The MOFT didn't have
administrative and personnel power over its bureaus. All 
the directors of the foreign trade bureaus were assigned by 
the organizational department of the provincial Communist 
Party Committee. However, the MOFT did have the power to 
assign the overseas's personnel though. There used to be a 
Ministry of Foreign Liaison that was in charge of economic 
cooperation with, and aid to, other communist and developing 
countries. For the purpose of simplifying the bulky 
bureaucratic government organizations, this ministry was 
merged with MOFT in 1982 and the new ministry became the 
Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT).
Another important subordinate to MOFERT is The China 
Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT). 
This is a semi-ministerial level organization representing 
non-governmental business affairs. The director of CCPIT is 
often an ex-vice minister of MOFERT. The CCPIT does not get 
directly involved in trade. Its main function is what MOFERT 
cannot do —  establish business relations with countries with 
which China has no formal diplomatic relations. Its other 
functions include organizing international trade exhibitions,
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arbitration, foreign business related legal publication, 
trademark registration, and so on.
We find similarities in China's foreign trade 
corporations (FTCs) to that of MOFERT. The FTCs are 
supposedly non-governmental business entities but they are 
directly administered by the MOFERT. All the presidents and 
general managers are assigned by the personnel bureau of 
MOFERT. These dozen FTCs have exclusive trading rights over 
their specialized products such as textiles, chemistry, 
silks, foodstuffs, light industry, and so on. Foreign 
trading rights are approved and assigned only by MOFERT. 
These FTCs have their "branches" in each province, autonomous 
region, and municipality directly administered by the state 
council. These branches are the basic trading units in 
China, actually conducting most of the import and export 
business with foreign customers. The Chinese refer to the 
FTCs as "head offices." This exposes another important 
distinction between FTCs and western corporations. 
Corporation would refer to the organization as a whole, while 
"head office" here only refers to the group of people in 
Beijing under the MOFERT. Prior to 1978, the head offices 
had more power in business over the branches even though the 
head offices didn't have personnel power. Most of the 
contracts were only signed by the head office people for 
control purposes. After the business was concluded, a copy 
of the contract was then sent to the relevant branches for
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execution. After 1978, the "branches" of the FTCs were 
becoming increasingly independent of the head offices and 
more affiliated to the foreign trade bureaus who had 
administrative and personnel power over these branches, than 
to the head offices who only supervise their businesses. They 
actually became more like "companies" with independent 
accounting units than "branches" as suggested by their 
names. Under this authoritarian system, administrative and 
personnel power often carried more weight than the 
supervision of business. We can see clearly the management 
dilemma the head offices and the branches have with these 
conflicting and vague affiliations and control structures.
Besides these specialized foreign trade corporations 
directly administered by MOFERT (See Appendix D for the major 
FTCs under MOFERT) , there were growing number of corporations 
administered by other industrial ministries that also had 
foreign trading rights authorized by MOFERT. These 
corporations tended to be very specialized in their relevant 
industries such as shipbuilding, aero-technology, automotive, 
postal and telecommunications appliances, and so forth (See 
Appendix E for selected FTCs administered by ministries other 
than MOFERT). Provincial governments were also establishing 
their general-purpose trading corporations to grab a share 
from the FTCs, especially in import. Businesses done by 
these corporations used to have only about 10% of the total
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import and export value. Due to the reform and open-door 
policy, these corporations were increasing their share of the 
business tremendously. The 1988 World Bank Country Report 
estimated that business done by corporations other than FTCs 
increased from 11% to 28% in the four years from 1981 to 
1984.^®
The head offices under MOFERT had a lot of power with 
respect to some major industrial and agricultural products. 
MOFERT gave the exclusive trading rights of these 
economically weighty products such as crude oil, wheat, rice, 
food stuffs, cotton, wood products, and so on to the head 
offices, who in turn established specialized departments to 
deal with these products. They could assign the task of 
purchasing products to the branches, while keeping the 
selling rights to themselves. These products are usually big 
in volume and easy to control process-wise, making it 
possible for the head offices to handle these transactions 
all by themselves. For smaller volume products like light 
industrial products, arts and crafts, garments, animal by­
products, etc., the head offices had to rely on the branches 
to handle all transactions. The head offices' major tasks 
were thus planning and budgeting the import and export 
business for the branches. They also organized trade fairs, 
trading delegations to visit their foreign customers, 
statistical record-keeping, data preparation for the 
ministry's negotiations with foreign governments on trade
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agreements, and the set up of overseas representative's 
offices and joint ventures.
II. The Operation 
Planning is the first stage of operation. During the 
latter half of each year, the State Planning Commission (SPC) 
assembles representatives of MOFERT, the Ministry of Finance, 
the People's Bank of China, the Bank of China, and the FTCs' 
head offices to formulate an initial plan for the year's 
exports. Prior to this, SPC will collect each ministry's 
import plans. The export plan is formulated with an starting 
objective of determining how much export is needed in order 
to realize the necessary imports, then, how much of the 
import plan cannot be covered by the export plan and must be 
financed elsewhere. The import plan is primarily an 
aggregate of plans submitted by the different ministries. 
Unless a constituent plan is either unrealistic or does not 
conform with the import policies (e.g., calls for the import 
of consumer goods instead of other more needed industrial 
goods), MOFERT usually cannot change its composition 
without consent from the relevant ministry.
Formulation of the export plan is MOFERT's major task. 
A plan's structure is based upon two conditions: one is
available historical data, the other is the capability of 
providing more suitable goods and more export capacity for 
existing products from each FTC. Of course, the head offices
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would have already gathered these data and information from 
the branches by the time of the yearly meeting. After 1978, 
there was no real ideological barrier preventing export. 
Anything that could be exported was encouraged to be 
exported. The only guiding policy was to export more 
finished products than semifinished products and raw 
materials.
The planning process is initially a bargaining process. 
MOFERT always wants to impose more export upon the head 
offices. The head offices always lay out different kinds of 
exportation or production difficulties in an attempt to 
reduce the planned amount. Nobody wants a big plan that 
could hardly be fulfilled, it would sound bad in the year- 
end report and could jeopardize some benefits and bonuses. 
Once the head offices reach an agreement on the amount of 
export, there would come the second round of bargaining 
between the head offices and the branches. The aggregate 
plan becomes mandatory once the head offices accept MOFERT*s 
plan. The only room for adjustment would be among different 
branches, the results depending on bargaining power of the 
branches. Even after the plan becomes mandatory, in the face 
of extreme hardship or unforeseeable market changes, the head 
offices can always appeal to MOFERT for changes in the plan 
such that the benefits and bonuses budgeted for the branches 
would remain unaffected.
The implementation of the plan rests mainly on the
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branches, as the branches deal with most of the products. 
The head offices have some administrative control over the 
operations of the branches in areas such as issuing import 
and/or export licenses, allocation of quotas, allocation of 
the foreign exchange budget, trade group organization, 
organization of trade fairs, and so forth. Prior to 1978, 
the head offices were signing all the contracts. The 
branches didn't have the authority to sign contracts, even 
though they were the ones to execute the contracts. Along 
with the furthering of reform, the branches have acquired 
more and more authority. If the products are not required 
by MOFERT to be dealt with by the head office, some of the 
branches don't even deal with the head offices any more, 
unless the products need quota or other licenses controlled 
by the head offices.
There are two important fairs held biannually in Canton 
for export commodities. These two fairs are the biggest 
events in China's foreign trade each year and provide the 
best means for the head offices to control the branches. 
The head offices used to allow the branches to accept orders 
only during these fairs. All the contracts would be signed 
by the head offices and copies of these contracts were 
retained by them. After the fair contracts would be
fulfilled. If business was concluded outside the fair, it 
had to be accomplished during the trade groups' visits 
abroad, as organized by the head offices. Whenever foreign
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customers visited China on business, discussions were 
supposed to be held exclusively in the head offices in 
Beijing. If customers insisted on going to the branches, 
then usually the head offices would send someone to accompany 
the customers to visit the branches. These practices proved 
impossible to continue during the years of reform.
Ill. The Reform 
With the deepening of reform in China's overall economic 
structure, the old structure of the foreign trade 
organizations was no longer sufficient to meet growing 
demands. Enterprises having business with the monopolized 
FTCs began to feel more and more dissatisfied with the bad 
service they received. The major problems were the sluggish 
bureaucracy, the insensitivity, the inefficiency, the 
corruption and excessive costs that the FTCs accrued in 
dealing with manufacturers, buyers, and suppliers. Many 
industrial ministries openly challenged the monopolistic 
power of FTCs under MOFERT. In 1985, the Ministry of 
Textiles Industry, led by the Minister Wu Winying, 
complained to the then Premier Zhao Ziyang about the 
inefficiency of MOFERT and its FTCs, and demanded drastic 
reform, including handing over foreign trading rights to the 
industrial ministries such as the Ministry of Textile 
Industry, in order to overcome the "airlock" between the FTCs 
and the industrial suppliers and u s e r s . T h e  report by the
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Minister actually accused MOFERT of being responsible for 
creating barriers between the domestic suppliers and 
international buyers and thus preventing textile exports from 
growing as fast as they could.
It was not a new problem. Prior to that, MOFERT had 
conducted some studies about the existing problems within 
its organizational settings. They made some efforts in 
decentralizing control to lower level units to achieve better 
and more efficient management. MOFERT was forced to do this 
because of competition from the newly established 
institutions that were authorized by the State Council to 
have similar power in international dealings. One such 
institution was the China International Trust and Investment 
Corporation (CITIC) , a ministerial institution headed by Rong 
Yiren, Vice Leader of the People's Congress. This 
institution was primarily designed to attract foreign capital 
investment in China, Observers could smell that if the boss 
of CITIC was more powerful than the minister of MOFERT, then 
his corporation would be more influential in business than 
the FTCs under MOFERT.
MOFERT submitted a report to the State Commission on 
Reform of the Foreign Trade System in 1984- In the report 
MOFERT proposed to reform the foreign trade organizations 
along the following five dimensions.
1) Separate government functions from enterprise 
management and strengthen the administrative management of
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foreign trade. This proposal aimed at MOFERT's leaving 
all day-to-day functions related to trade to the FTCs so that 
MOFERT could concentrate on such areas as drafting 
regulations, formulating long term plans, advising on the 
appropriateness of economic levers related to trade, 
conducting negotiations with foreign governments, and 
conducting research and training.
2) Simplify administration and transfer power to lower 
administrative levels, bringing into full play the managing 
initiative of the various foreign trade enterprises.
This proposal was meant to free the foreign trade 
enterprises from their administrative departments, while 
keeping their own accounts, assuming responsibility for their 
own profits and losses, and developing in the direction of 
specialization and socialization.
3) Adopt an import and export agency system to improve 
the operations and management of foreign trade.
This proposal meant that the foreign trade enterprises 
should provide the diversified services that a normal foreign 
trade agent would provide, besides their designated product 
line. This practice would introduce the competition 
mechanism into the foreign trade organizations. When these 
enterprises failed to provide good services, the manufacturer 
and the user could go to other "agents" for better service.
4) Reform the foreign trade planning system and simplify 
the contents of the yearly export/import plan.
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5) Reform the foreign trade financial system and 
strengthen the economic means of regulation.
The last two proposals were designed to give the foreign 
trade enterprises more power in their planning and decision 
making, giving them more responsibility for their own profits 
and losses.
The general direction of these proposals was
decentralization and diversification. MOFERT described the 
spirit of their proposals by a four character expression —  
an English equivalent of which could be: "Simplifying the
Administration and Decentralizing the Power." Yet
implementing these proposals proved harder than formulating 
them.
Structurally, head offices are under direct
administration of MOFERT. They are in many ways the arms of 
MOFERT and are much closer to MOFERT than the foreign trade 
bureaus of the provincial governments. These foreign trade 
bureaus are supposed to be the local agencies of MOFERT, but 
for personnel and administrative reasons they are more 
associated with the local governments than with MOFERT. The 
head offices had a lot of the administrative functions of 
MOFERT in the period of 1978 to 1986. A good example would 
be the allocation of textile quotas with the then EEC. MOFERT 
would allocate the quota to each specialized head office, 
then the head offices would allocate them to their provincial 
branches. Quota allocation is obviously an administrative
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function. Many branches that didn't have enough quota for 
export would be unhappy with the head offices and would come 
to complain to the foreign trade bureaus that they couldn't 
fulfil their export plan because they didn't have enough 
quota, and that the head offices had given preferential 
treatment to certain other branches. This kind of 
controversy was quite common under that structure. MOFERT 
was in great dilemma about what to do; they were really 
reluctant to cut the power in their head offices and thereby 
decentralize their own power amongst the local foreign trade 
bureaus.
Despite the difficulties, growing competition forced 
MOFERT to change, CITIC was establishing its branches in 
big cities and provinces. Foreign trade bureaus were 
establishing their own foreign trade companies under their 
control. MOFERT tried to implement some of the proposals, 
achieving the following:
1) The previous "branches" of the FTCs became more 
independent of the head offices, especially those dealing 
with products not MOFERT-prescribed to the head offices. 
This change gave the provincial companies more decision­
making power and made them look more like companies than 
"branches".
2) Experiments introducing the "agency" system made the 
head offices and branches pay much more attention to the 
adequacies of their services. Previously, the manufacturers
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had no choice but to go through the designated company to 
export their products. Now if they were unhappy with the 
service they received, they could go to a company of a 
different province for business. This system also allowed 
FTCs with particular specializations to deal with other 
products. Although these experiments were limited to only a 
few FTCs, the significance of bringing the competition 
mechanism into these FTCs who had previously taken their 
privileges for granted was far reaching. With this new 
flexibility, companies could easily diversify into different 
lines of business as long as they operated efficiently.
3) A great change was taking place in management 
objectives. Previously, foreign trade enterprises were only 
concerned with fulfilling the import and export plan, because 
any loss was born by the state in the form of a subsidy. Now 
they had to be concerned not only with fulfilling the plan, 
but also in breaking even or making a profit. The planning 
process was also simplified. Not all the plans are mandatory. 
The part of the plan that is mandatory is now called the 
"command plan", while the part of the plan that is not 
mandatory became known as the "guidance plan." This left the 
foreign trade enterprises much more room and responsibility 
to formulate their own business goals and strategies.
However, with all the efforts taken by MOFERT to reform 
its organizations, the most basic change didn't take place
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until the beginning of 1988. Essential change lay in 
structural change —  change that would redefine the 
relationship between the head offices and the branches, as 
well as the relationship between the head offices and MOFERT 
itself. This structure was created more than 30 years ago 
in imitation of the Soviet model, to fit the old ideological 
necessity and the centrally planned economy. Under the new 
economic and political conditions, any reform measures taken 
in China's foreign trade would be superficial without a 
restructuring of the whole system. But restructuring was no 
easy matter: restructuring a giant, complex 40-year-old
organization took great courage and tremendous efforts.
In the beginning of 1988, then-premier Zhao Ziyang was 
quite decisive in his actions to restructure the foreign 
trade organizations, despite very strong opposition. His 
policies centered around the overall pursuit of contracting 
a management-of-responsibility system. This policy was aimed 
at changing the old foreign trade system which dispersed 
responsibility, authority, and profits into a new system 
which unified these three, and therefore made the new system 
an entity responsible for its own profit and losses, instead 
of the state. The major policies undertaken were the 
following:
1) The provinces, autonomous regions, state-council 
administered municipalities, and the FTCs which undertake 
execution of the export plan were to contract directly from
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the state the export plan for foreign exchange and turn in 
the foreign exchange to the central government after 
fulfillment of the plans. If the basic target of the 
contract was attained, then a percentage of foreign exchange 
could be retained by the contracting units. If there was any 
excess foreign exchange realized beyond the basic target, 
most or all of the excess foreign exchange could be retained 
by the contracting units.
2) All the foreign exchange earning enterprises enjoyed 
tax breaks, including relief from the product tax incurred 
in the production process, the commercial tax incurred in 
the circulation process, and the value-added tax.
3) The local governments, and other contracting units 
that retained foreign exchange could use it without prior 
approval if the usage was in accordance with relevant state 
regulations.
4) With the exception of the head offices and their 
relevant branches that are regulated to exclusively deal with 
certain products, all other branches of FTCs were to be 
decentralized to the local governments and managed by the 
unified state policy. The local government was to divide the 
export plan contracted by each foreign trade company and the 
relevant manufacturer and to push forward the export agency 
system.
5) The specialization system was to be liberalized. 
Except for a few important, resource-oriented commodities
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dealt with exclusively by one or a few FTCs in import and 
export, most of the commodities and products were to be freed 
from regulated specializations and dealt with by any foreign 
trade companies having the foreign trade rights.
6) After the reform; the head offices were to develop 
themselves in the direction of multi-functional, multi­
national conglomerates, to develop the international markets, 
and to provide better service for the foreign trade.
These new policies shocked the head offices. They had 
been too powerful for so many years and had gotten used to 
their power. The very idea that the branches would not 
listen to them any more made them nervous; and the very idea 
that the manufacturers and users would decide whether they 
need the services of the head offices made them unable to 
accept the reality. Many head offices protested, but to no 
avail. They had to reexamine what to do when power was 
decentralized to the branches. The major strategy was to 
establish more subsidiaries and joint ventures overseas. 
Overseas operations were regulated to get prior approval 
from MOFERT. It was much easier for .the head offices to get 
the approval from MOFERT than for the branches. The FTCs did 
develop a better network of overseas representative offices. 
Another possibility was to transform the head offices into 
business associations, such as a textile importers and 
exporters association. This would still enable them to 
retain a certain power as a industry group.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
42
The branches seemed to gain their own footing. Many of 
them were trying to formulate new, competitive strategies. 
Some branches were thinking of having joint ventures with 
the head offices so that they could use the overseas network 
of the head offices to their advantage. In any case, this 
was a extremely dynamic period for the foreign trade 
organizations.
Outside the MOFERT system, an important measure was 
taken to grant foreign trading rights to major export- 
oriented manufacturing enterprises. This was aimed at 
eliminating the "airlock" between foreign buyers and domestic 
producers. These enterprises were authorized to recruit 
personnel for international business. Many people were 
recruited from foreign trade companies and foreign trade 
schools in starting their own direct foreign business. The 
results of this experiment were mixed. Some enterprises 
achieved more efficiency in producing and selling, especially 
in meeting customers' needs. Some others handled production 
well but selling poorly, as international sales required 
specific knowledge in business transactions and 
communications. Comparatively speaking, foreign trade 
companies had a broader customer base and more knowledge in 
daily transactions and customs regulations.
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POLICY ISSUES IN CHINA’S FOREIGN TRADE
I. Composition of Trade 
China has a vast territory, rich in resources. Yet 
China's huge population reduces the actual resource per 
capita to a value much smaller than the world average. 
Therefore, exporting raw materials and primary products 
cannot be a policy in China's foreign trade. Under the open- 
door policy, China has intentionally tried to change the 
composition of the import and export commodities.
In the '50s, agricultural products and other primary 
products accounted for as much as 79.4% of the total export, 
industrial products only 20.6%. Until 1966, primary products 
were still more than 60% of the total export. In the '70s, 
industrial products exportation slightly increased, such that 
by 1978, they accounted for 46.5% of the total export,From 
then on, China's economy came into a period of steady and 
fast growth. Industrial structure changed greatly, bringing 
changes in the composition, of export commodities and 
providing the necessary conditions for further processing and 
finishing of the products. In this time, besides continuing 
to export the traditional products, China increased its pace 
of export for equipment, machine tools, ships, consumer
43
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appliances, and so forth. Domestic-made airplanes also 
joined in the export commodities and came onto the 
international market for the first time. In 1988, primary 
products exported were $14,453 billion, only 35.6% of the 
total export, while exports of finished industrial products 
were $ 26.186 billion, 64.4% of the total export.This 
change improved China's economic conditions and was in 
accordance with the direction of the world trade.
There are still serious problems in the composition of 
China's exports. - Taking 1987 for example, industrial 
products exported were $21,259 billion, 61.2% of the year's 
total export. Among them, light industrial and textile 
products were $14 billion, 40.3% of the total export. Under 
the prevailing conditions, to export as much as these 
products for foreign exchange was good policy. Yet these 
products are still low-value products. When there is demand 
in the domestic market and competition is very strong in 
international market, excessively reliance upon these 
products for increasing export is not in the best interest 
of the country's economy. After careful study of the 
products being traded in the world market, MOFERT decided 
that machinery and electronic products were the most 
promising for export. These products constituted about 20% 
of the world trade in the '50s, about 25% in the '60s, and 
about 33% presently, and will increase more in the future. 
More than fifty percent of some developed countries' export
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
45
is represented by machinery and electronic products. China 
has tried hard to increase production and export of these 
goods. From 1986 to 1988, the increase of these products in 
export was more than 50%. The total export of these products 
in 1988 came to $6.2 billion, 13% of the total export.This 
is still a small percentage. Priority is given to the 
expansion of these industries.
II. Foreign Debt and Investment 
China's foreign debt increased very rapidly after 1979, 
with recent years seeing accelerated increases. From 1985 
to 1988, the foreign debts were respectively $15.8 billion, 
$21.5 billion, $30.2 billion, and $40 billion, for an average 
growth rate of 36%. The composition of this debt was also 
changing in a desirable direction. Short term debt decreased 
from 41% in 1985 to 18% in 1 9 8 8 U.S. dollars, Japanese 
Yen, Hong Kong dollars. West German Marks, French Francs, and 
Special Drawing Rights constitute the major currencies of the 
debt. Among them, U.S. Dollars and Japanese Yen represent 
the biggest share. The foreign debts were mainly invested 
in basic industries such as agriculture, transportation, 
energy, and the chemical industry. Consideration was also 
given to industries such as machinery, light industry, 
textile industry, electronics, education, health, and so on.
The general principle of the debt management is termed
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as "unified leadership and specialized responsibilities." 
That is, the State Council takes charge of making foreign 
borrowing policies and separate government agencies take care 
of borrowing plans plus the management of debts from 
different resources. The Ministry of Finance is in charge 
of borrowing from the World Bank. MOFERT is in charge 
foreign governmental loans. The People's Bank of China is 
in charge of loans from IMF and the Asian Development Bank. 
The Ministry of Agriculture, Husbandry, and Fisheries is in 
charge of loans from the Organization of International
Agricultural Development Funds. Finally, the Bank of China 
is in charge of energy loans from Japan's Import Bank as well 
as with issuing bonds internationally. In order to 
facilitate commercial borrowing, the State Council approved 
10 "windows" through which foreign commercial loans could be 
made. These windows are the Bank of China, the Bank of 
Transportation, the Bank of Investment, and the CITIC and 
its branches in Tianjin, Shanghai, Dalian, Guangdong, Fujian, 
and Hainan provinces.
There are three ways of borrowing and repaying the debt
in China. The first is unified borrowing and unified
repaying. This refers to the kind of borrowing done by
governmental agencies, where the interest and the principles 
are in turn repaid by these government agencies. This kind 
of debt includes the loans from international monetary 
organizations and foreign governments, and is used mainly in
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basic industries and within the country's infrastructure. 
The second type of credit transaction is unified borrowing 
and self-repaying. This kind of borrowing usually comes from 
the local governments and enterprises. It is approved by the 
central government and then borrowing is carried out by the 
central government but repaid by the local governments and 
enterprises. This kind of borrowing has increased greatly 
in recent years. The third type of transaction is self­
borrowing and self-repaying. This kind of borrowing is 
enacted by the borrowers themselves through authorized 
windows and repaid by the borrowing entities.
In order to supervise and monitor external borrowing, 
the State Council approved the Tentative Regulation For 
Monitoring External Debt. This regulation rules that all 
the borrowers within the territory of China must report 
borrowing to the General Administration of Foreign Exchange 
Control and register the loans, reporting any changes 
occurring after the initial registration. These measures 
were aimed at completely controlling the external borrowing, 
which was a major recommendation from the World Bank. In the 
latter's country report of 1988, it specifically called for 
"setting limits on the aggregate amount of external borrowing 
consistent with the medium-term BOP (balance of payment) 
outlook" and "approval and control procedures are required" 
to ensure that "limits are adhered to and composition is 
met. The Chinese government seemed to be taking this
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advice seriously. But how to balance the control of the 
debts by the government and the adjustment of the debts by 
the market mechanism which has been introduced into the 
Chinese economy through the reform programs? This is a 
bigger challenge to the Chinese government than simply 
controlling the debts themselves.
Foreign investment is the highlight of the "open door" 
policy. The import of foreign technology and equipment has 
always been given priority, but in many instances those 
imports fail to produce the results and efficiency expected 
by the various Chinese industrial users. The Chinese 
government gradually realized that foreign managerial know­
how should accompany the import of foreign technology and 
equipment and the need for more capital investment plus the 
need for direct foreign participation in management became 
a major consideration in the government's determination to 
attract more foreign direct investment. To achieve this, a 
series of laws and regulations have been promulgated. They 
include; law on joint venture, regulations on the 
registration of joint ventures, regulations on labor 
management in joint ventures, an income-tax law on joint 
ventures, the law of economic contracts, regulations on the 
exploitation of offshore petroleum resources in cooperation 
with foreign enterprises, the laws of Special Economic Zones, 
etc.
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There are six kinds of arrangements that comprise foreign 
investment in China. They are the wholly foreign-owned 
ventures, equity joint ventures, contractual joint ventures, 
joint development, compensation trade, and processing and 
assembling. Contractual joint venture is very similar to 
equity joint venture, only it is more flexible than the 
latter in the form of partnership; it can do whatever the 
contracting parties agree to. Joint development is mainly 
used for foreign-Chinese cooperation in exploiting natural 
resources —  most commonly for offshore oil. Compensation 
trade is different from other forms in that the purchase of 
machinery from abroad, by a local enterprise, is financed in 
whole or in part by goods produced after the purchase. In 
processing and assembling, the foreign parties provide some 
or all the inputs to a product, then the Chinese enterprise 
uses the inputs to make the product which is then returned 
to the foreign party for a fee.̂ ^
The results have been amazing. From 1979 to 1988, the 
number of foreign direct investment (FDI) enterprises was 
10,052, government approved agreements numbered 15,997, and 
the capital actually invested amounted to $11,517 billion. 
The Chinese government made FDI easiest in the Special 
Economic Zones (SEZ), with flexible regulations and various 
tax breaks. In Shenzhen, the best known SEZ, for example, 
"by the end of 1986 some 760 foreign enterprises had 
industrial contracts in Shenzhen, and there were 3,000
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additional agreements for export processing.... already §600 
million had been invested in industry. The year 1988
turned out to be a record year for FDI in China. The number 
of government- approved FDI agreements was 5,903, and actual 
invested foreign capital totalled §2.6 billion.
In 1986, an American company made a survey of 70 joint 
venture enterprises in China. 60% of those surveyed 
expressed satisfaction with FDI results, 25% were unable to 
reply because the businesses had just been opened, and 15% 
replied as having real difficulties. In 1988 this company 
resurveyed the same enterprises again. This time, 91% of 
those surveyed were satisfied, while only 9% were having 
difficulties. This probably is a very favorable survey to 
the Chinese government as it is quoted by Liu Yimin, the 
director of the Bureau of the Administration of Foreign 
Investment under MOFERT.
In investment, the U.S. businesses came to agreement 
with China on 252 projects in 1988, amounting to §325 
million. Since 1979, the U.S. has always been one of the 
biggest investors in China. Sino-U.S. joint ventures
include the much-watched Beijing Jeep, a joint venture with 
Chrysler Co., Tianjin-Otis Elevators, Kentucky Fried Chicken, 
Caterpillar, etc. Such cooperative ventures have had mixed 
results: the history of the Beijing-Jeep probably embodies 
a lot of bitterness for both sides,while joint ventures 
like Tianjin-Otis Elevators and Kentucky Fried Chicken have
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had steady growth.
III. Trade With U.S.
The "Shanghai Communique" signed in 1972 between the U.S. 
and Chinese government paved the way for U.S. reconciliation 
with China. The Nixon administration regarded normalization 
of relations with China as a key strategic goal for the 
stability of the far east. In January 1979, the two
countries established a full diplomatic relationship. This 
turned a new page in trade between these two countries.
In 1979, the two governments reached their first Trade 
Agreement, which granted mutual MFN (Most Favored Nation) 
status for each other, facilitating bi-lateral trade between 
the two countries —  such as allowing the Bank of China to 
operate in the U.S. and the U.S. banks to operate in China, 
and recognizing that China is a developing country in order 
to clear the way for the possible granting of duty-free 
imports through the Generalized System of Preference (GSP), 
if China joins the IMF and GATT.
China needs U.S. as a trade partner in its four- 
modernizations program. China especially is interested in 
advanced U.S. technologies and capital equipment, and is also 
a big buyer of U.S. agricultural products. China strives to 
lure U.S. investment. In return, China is becoming an 
increasingly important supplier of textiles, toys, and light 
industrial consumer products.
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1988 was a good year in the history of U.S.-China trade. 
According to the Chinese statistics, total trade amounted to 
$8,262 billion, a 22% increase'from a year before; China 
exported $ 3.21 billion, and U.S. exported $ 5.052 billion. 
U.S. statistics gives a different picture: total trade was 
$14.3 billion; U.S. exported $5.3 billion, which is close to 
the Chinese figure; and U.S. imported $9.3 billion.There 
is no explanation why the Chinese figure is so low. The 
statistics from the Chinese customs sometimes is higher by 
$20 billion than that of MOFERT, due to different accounting 
methods. The U.S. figure should be more reliable here 
because the Chinese has run a significant surplus in recent 
years. And the Chinese figure does show that. In 1989, 
total trade rose by 31% to a historic high of $17.8 billion. 
U.S. exported $5.8 billion, and China exported $12 billion, 
leaving a U.S. trade deficit of $6.2 billion.The major 
Chinese products sold in the U.S. were textiles, garments, 
oil, foodstuffs, animal by-products, arts and crafts, 
porcelain, metals, and chemical products. The major U.S. 
products bought in China were crude oil equipment, chemical 
equipment, aircraft, computers, steel, rubber and related 
products, fertilizer, chemical materials, medical equipment, 
paper, and so forth.
XV. June 4th: Turning Back 
June 4th, 1989 was the day the Chinese students' pro-
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democracy movement was brutally suppressed. This day marked 
a turning back of modern Chinese history. More than ten 
years ' economic reform was put to an end that day by the very 
man who initiated it.
After the suppression, economists and scholars were busy 
calculating how many man days of work were lost from April 
through June.^^ The figure came close to 10 to 15 billion. 
These 15 billion man-days were really not that important when 
compared to the real loss —  the changing of political and 
economic direction and the loss of life's meaning for many 
Chinese people. The Wall Street Journal quoted one Chinese 
as saying; "Once Chinese believed that building a socialist 
society gave meaning to their lives. Now Chinese wonder why 
they were born. We don't have the means to live life, nor 
do we even have something to die for. We merely consume 
time.
The immediate impact of the pro-democracy movement on 
international business was the halt of foreign investment 
and loans. Major international financial institutions, such 
as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank (the two world 
leading lenders to China's ambitious economic programs) 
suspended their loans to China after the suppression. This 
caused great financing problems for many infrastructural 
projects then under construction in China. The World Bank 
didn't resume its loans until eight months later. Its first 
loan to China was made in February, 1990, and was aimed at
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agricultural projects/’
In November 1989, five months after the Tiananmen 
suppression, debt issued by China and Hong Kong was 
downgraded by Moody's Investors Service Inc., a world 
lending-rating agency. The business community's concern over 
the dependence of Hong Kong's economy on the mainland's 
political and economic weather immediately reflected this 
downgrade in status. Some observers say that the rating 
itself will have little new impact on China's borrowing 
because the increased risk had already been reflected in the 
new recent loans to the mainland, but will make it more 
difficult for China to tap the capital market.
The freeze on lending greatly affected foreign trade, 
especially imports. "The import pie will shrink", many 
business people cried. Import growth, as compared with the 
year before, slowed to 16% in July and 7.1% in August, in 
contrast with an average growth rate of 26% in the first 
half. The whole year's import was $38,127 billion, a 
decrease of 3.9% from the previous year.®’ It may take years 
to see the negative impact of this decrease in import on the 
growth of export. The import of urgently needed raw 
materials and high-tech equipment for China's 
industrialization has slowed down, this in turn will slow 
down the growth of industrial output which was expected to 
represent a major part of export commodity in the years 
ahead. Because of this response-time lag, it is difficult
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to accurately and completely assess the damage now, but we 
can be quite certain that damage has been done and will 
gradually show itself.
Among things that will suffer most from the change of 
direction are the reform programs begun under the now-purged 
Communist Party chief, Zhao Ziyang. According to a foreign 
correspondent in Beijing, many of the programs "have been 
scrapped indefinitely. Aborted programs include decontrol 
of prices, sales of state-owned enterprises and strengthening 
the private sector —  all of which seemed likely to move 
forward a year ago. Instead, the leaders are preaching 
austerity, socialist orthodox and even recentralizing sectors 
of the economy that had been well on the way to decontrol.
The reform program aimed at foreign trade system is one 
of the economic sectors being severely affected. Actually, 
foreign trade corporations were the first group of units 
targeted for shake-up and reorganization after the 
suppression. This was intended to purify the foreign trade 
organizations in order to calm down the public indignation 
for the party's corruption, as these organizations were known 
for their nepotism —  their organizations are full of the 
sons and daughters of high ranking Party officials. The 
Party's central committee hurried to make public a decision 
that the family members of the central Party leaders are not 
allowed to work in these organizations. This really 
reflected the sensitivity and importance of these
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organizations in Chinese society.
According to reports, the decision to recentralize major 
segments of the Chinese economy came from a plenum of the 
Communist Party's Central Committee in November 1989. A 
Chinese economist who had seen documentation of this plenum 
remarked that a central theme prevails in the documents —  
centralization, politically and economically. Taking 
Guangdong Province for example, an official of the 
Commission of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade of the 
province estimated that 40% of the 1512 companies in 
Guangdong engaged in foreign trade would be closed or merged. 
The companies that survived closure and merger would be 
severely restricted in what they can trade. "The crackdown 
will return China to the system of the early 1980s, when a 
few specialized state-owned trading companies handled the 
nation's trade," the Wall Street Journal article commented.
V. Future Prospects 
Suppression of the pro-democracy movement has created 
severe aftershocks within Chinese society as a whole, not to 
mention its economy and foreign trade. The prospects of 
China's foreign trade naturally have become of great concern 
to the international business community.
Some analysts think China is in a recession, as there 
was a sharp plunge in industrial output in January, 1990.
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Output fell 6.1% from a year earlier to $27.1 billion, 
according to China's State Statistical Bureau figures. That 
was the worst decline ever during the 11 years of reform. 
A recession is defined as two consecutive quarters in which 
a nation's economic output contracts. While China doesn't 
provide quarterly figures, some economists believe that 
China's GNP declined in the 1989 fourth quarter and perhaps 
in the third quarter as well. Yet overall in 1989, China's 
GNP grew 4%. The Chinese government attributed declines to 
the four days' holidays of the traditional Chinese lunar year 
—  the biggest holiday in China.
Other analysts pointed out that China could exhaust 
foreign reserve sometime this year unless imports are cut 
drastically to help narrow the balance of payment. A country 
is considered financially healthy if its reserves cover three 
months of its imports and China's $14 billion reserve could 
cover just that if the previous import pace to continue. 
But what indeed transpired was a drastic cut in imports. In 
January, 1990, imports declined by as much as 12.6% from that 
of the last year, to $5.4 billion, while exports came to 
$2.84 billion, an increase of 1% from that of the previous
55year.
In overall foreign trade for 1989, the total import and 
export value came to $81.5 billion. Export was $43,128 
billion, with an increase of 6.5% from a year before; import 
was $38.27 billion, a decrease of 3.95% from a year before.
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These figures actually are surprisingly positive, taking into 
consideration the effects of the Tiananmen repression: the 
huge loss of man-days, the economic sanctions of the western 
countries, and the freeze of loans.
There are several possible explanations for why China 
managed to do quite well in such a politically and 
economically chaotic year. First, growth rate was so great 
in previous years that this year's chaotic situation merely 
slowed it down. The average growth rate of the last 11 years 
in total foreign trade was 16.1%, while the growth rate of 
1989 from that of 1988 was only 1.3%, a sharp plunge
already, which was especially affected by the cut in imports. 
Secondly, external trade is very much controlled by market 
forces when the government does not constrain them. The past 
11 years of expansion had built up demand and supply of 
Chinese trade in the world market. The demand from within 
can be controlled by the government at their will, but the 
demands from other countries remain and are not easily 
shifted elsewhere once business channels are established. 
Besides, the Chinese government still tried hard to encourage 
foreign trade because more trade could only contribute to a 
better economy —  the basis for the political stability, the 
latter being the foremost concern of the ruling Communist 
Party. This may in one way demonstrate that economic 
sanctions do not work well economically. They may work very 
well politically —  political pressure veiled as economic in
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nature.
Thirdly, half a year is really too short a time to assess 
the full economic impact. There could be a time lag, a 
delayed causation. It may take several years or more for 
these to manifest themselves. Also, longer-term data will 
be more reliable in substantiating any assessment.
From the above explanations and statistics we can see 
that the prospects of China's foreign trade do not look as 
bad as some observers have thought. Though the political 
suppression in June has indeed negatively influenced China's 
economy and therefore also her foreign trade, and the 
economic recentralization and political tightening have also 
set back trade reform programs, officially the Chinese 
government still claims to maintain the economic reform and 
the "open door" policy. We have every reason to believe 
these claims, as a reasonably good economy provides a stable 
basis for their political rule. Their problem is that their 
political policies are not in harmony with their economic 
policies. Political expedience is often at the expense of 
economy, and the economy cannot keep the pace of previous 
growth. Even during the period of reform, ".... occasional 
recourse to the familiar rhetoric of self-sufficiency suggest 
that the legacy of the Maoist era may influence the pattern 
of activity for some time. Yet the economy still grows, 
even though at a slower pace. The road of reform is full of
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twists, but the trend is forward and upward.
Secondly, the dynamic market forces give the advantage 
to economic development. While most businesses are waiting 
to see what will happen in China, some firms are again 
becoming active in investment activities there. The leading 
U.S. firms are AT&T, Pepsi Cola, and MacDonald-Douglas and 
Du Pont. AT&T's new investment, in the name of its Dutch 
subsidiary, is on optical fibre communication equipment in 
Shanghai. And at this time when most western firms are 
hesitating, investors from Taiwan are pouring into China 
seeking investment opportunities. The recent exposure of the 
investment intent of Taiwan Plastic one of the largest 
conglomerates in the world, shocked all of Taiwan like the 
detonation of an atom bomb. Taiwan has the largest foreign 
exchange reserve in the world, putting Japan in the second 
place. These new investments will certainly fill up some 
vacancies left by western investors and thereby inject new 
blood into the Chinese economy and provide new impetus to 
foreign trade. The law in Taiwan does not permit direct 
investment in mainland China, so these investments are being 
made and will be made in the names of their foreign 
subsidiaries.
Thirdly, the Chinese government recently eased its 
austerity program. Some economists say that this new move 
should breathe life into its sagging economy and give a boost 
to many cash-strapped Sino-foreign joint ventures. Probably
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it will start a new boom-bust cycle.
Even under the austerity policy, some of the joint 
ventures were still successful. Tianjin-Otis Elevator is a 
good example. In the past five years, it has produced about 
6 thousand elevators and the profit comes to 135 million 
yuan, about 30 million in U.S. dollars. It has 17% of the 
domestic market share and has established 16 branches around 
China. Otis has reached a new five year agreement with its 
Chinese partners to increase yearly production capacity from 
1500 elevators to 3000. This is a fine example of Sino-U.S. 
joint ventures.^’ Another successful example is the Oregon- 
based Nike Inc. After years of struggling with the Chinese 
bureaucracy, its patience has paid off. "Its five factories 
in south China are now making 650,000 pairs a month, and Nike 
hopes to export $100 million of shoes from China next year. 
Moreover, the China operation has just started turning a 
profit."^®
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper has explored many issues regarding the recent 
reforms in China's foreign trade system. After analyzing 
these issues, the major problem seems quite clear: the old- 
machine bureaucratic structure alienates the personnel 
administration and the business operation of these 
organizations in such a way that they cannot function as an 
organic whole. An effective organization is one that has 
blended its structure, management practices, rewards, and 
people into a package that in turn fits with its strategies.^’ 
The alienation of people from their organizations, and the 
alienation of branch offices from head offices, makes it 
impossible for this organization to achieve such a fit.
The reform launched in the beginning of 1988 was aimed 
at eliminating this alienation and was a very bold step in 
the right direction; had it continued, the effects upon these 
organizations would be unprecedented in their history. If 
it had been successful, the organizational structure would 
be in much better harmony with its task and mission, and each 
operating unit would have much more vitality and efficiency 
in their performances. Unfortunately, the suppression of the 
pro-democracy movement in June of 1989 abruptly changed the 
directions of politics and economics, and consequently made 
effective reform impossible.
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Under the previous Chinese political situation, it took 
strong leadership and great courage to attempt reform of the 
strongholds of the command planning system. In this 
connection, the ousted Party chief Zhao Ziyang deserves 
credits for the attempted reform. Singapore's Prime Minister 
Lee Kuan Yew once remarked:"It took Zhao Ziyang 10 years to 
build a team of economists who understood how the western 
economy works and now that the team is part in exile, part 
being rusticated and part missing." Rebuilding that team, 
Mr. Lee predicted, will take another ten years.
The Chinese constitute one fifth of the world population. 
Whoever is in power in China in the future, the conservatives 
or the reformers, will bear in mind that a sound and healthy 
economy provides a stable basis for political power. The one 
billion people need to eat, to live, to develop and to 
prosper. The present regime must therefore stick with the 
open-door policy, at least in some aspects, even though 
politically they are regressing in most other respects. But 
the open-door policy embodies a funny sort of "Catch 22" for 
the Chinese leadership: it has opened people's eyes and
minds; the twelve years' reform has brought about rapid 
economic growth and greatly raised people's living standards. 
There is no way to efface the people's political awakening 
or to bog down the economy. Under current conditions, 
China's economy will grow, even though at a much slower rate
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than it would under the original reform. Foreign trade will 
also grow. China is still the largest untapped market per 
capita in the world. The big potential of this market 
exists apart from China's political situation. It is 
therefore unwise to neglect or to abandon this market. Of 
course, it is inevitable that China's political situation 
will affect the conscience of the people dealing with China 
as well as the economic exchanges with China. But 
adjustments should be made in strategy, not in policy.
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Appendix A: SELECTED FIGURES ON CHINA'S EXTERNAL TRADE 
(1950-1989)
(In $ 000,000,000)
Year Export Import Total
1950 5.52 5.83 11.35
1951 7.57 11.98 19.55
1952 8.23 11.18 19.41
1953 10.22 13.46 23.68
1954 11.46 12.87 24.33
1955 14.12 17.33 31.45
1956 16.45 15.63 32.08
1957 15.97 15.06 31.03
1958 19.81 18.90 38.71
1959 22.61 21.20 43.81
1960 18.56 19.53 38.09
1961 14.91 14.45 29.36
1962 14 .90 11.73 26.63
1963 16.49 12. 66 29.15
1964 19.16 15.47 34.63
1965 22.28 20.17 42.45
1966 23.66 22.48 46.14
1967 21.35 20. 20 41.55
1968 21.03 19.45 40.48
1969 22.04 18.25 40.29
1970 22.60 23.26 45.86
1971 26.36 22.05 48.41
1972 34.43 28.58 63.01
1973 58.19 51.57 109.76
1974 69.49 76.19 145.68
1975 72.64 74.87 147.51
1976 68.55 65.78 134.33
1977 75.90 72.14 148.04
1978 97.45 108.93 206.38
1979 136.58 156.75 293.33
1980 182.72 195.50 378.22
1981 208.93 194.82 403.75
1982 218.19 174.78 392.97
1983 221.97 185.30 407,27
1984 244.16 253.56 497.72
1985 259.15 343.31 602.46
1986 270.14 330.83 600.97
1987 347.11 333.99 681.10
1988 406.40 398.50 804.90
1989 432.80 382.70 815.00
Source: China's Foreign Trade Year Book— - 1989
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Appendix B : SELECTED U.S. EXPORTS TO CHINA, 1988
(U.S. $ 000,000)
•
Value
Share
of Total(%)
Growth
over
1987(%)
Total U.S. Exports 5,032.9 100 44
Of which:
Grain 698.9 14 199
Plastics, resins 595.9 12 134
Wood Products 447.1 9 167
Fertilizers 378.7 8 40
Aircraft 341.1 7 -32
Specialized machinery 334.0 7 42
Organic chemicals 256.7 5 71
Scientific equipment 200.1 4 20
ADP equipment 200.1 4 6
General Industrial 
machinery
171.6 3 -3
Source: U.S. Commerce Department.
Exports calculated freight on board (f.o.b.)
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Appendix Cr SELECTED U.S. IMPORTS FROM CHINA, 1988
(U.S. $ 000,000)
Total U.S. Imports
Value
9,269.8
Share
of Total(%) 
100
Growth
Over
1987(%)
34
Of which:
Clothing 2,212.6 24 1
Toys, sporting goods 1,838.4 20 42
Yarn, fabrics 608.0 7 9
Telecommunications
equipment 528.6 6 112
Petroleum 496.7 5 -6
Household electrical 
appliances 465.6 5 198
Travel goods, handbags 461.9 5 45
Shellfish, seafood 331.1 4 131
Metal manufactures 266.0 3 66
Source: U.S. Commerce Department.
Imports calculated free along-side ship (f.a.s.)
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Append!y D: Major Foreign Trade Corporations Under The
Ministry Of Foreign Economic Relations and 
Trade
China National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs I/E Corp. 
China National Native Produce and Animal By-Products I/E 
Corp.
China National Textiles I/E Corp.
China National Light Industrial Products I/E Corp.
China National Arts & Crafts I/E Corp.
China National Chemicals I/E Corp.
China National Metals & Minerals I/E Corp.
China National Machinery I/E Corp.
China National Instruments I/E Corp.
China National Technical I/E Corp.
China National Medicines & Health Products I/E Corp.
China National Silk I/E Corp.
China National Embroidery & Drawnwork Associated I/E Corp. 
China National Packaging I/E Corp.
China National Foreign Trade Transportation Corp.
China National Complete Plant Export Corp.
China Economic and Trade Consultants Corp.
Source: Directory Of Chinese Foreign Economic Relations And 
Trade Enterprises (Beijing: China Foreign Economic 
Relations And Trade Publishing House, 1987)
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Appendiy Tü: Selected Foreign Trade Corporations Under
The Line Ministries.
China National Agricultural Machinery I/E Corp. 
China National Seed Corp.
China Rural and Town Enterprises I/E Company. 
China Textile Machinery and Technology I/E Corp. 
China International Water & Electric Corp.
China National Offshore Oil Corp.
China Petro-Chemical International Company.
China National New Building Materials I/E Corp. 
China National Nonferrous Metals I/E Corp.
China National Machinery & Equipment I/E Corp. 
China National Electric Wire & Cable Export Corp. 
China North Industries Corp.
China Great Wall Industry Corp.
China Nuclear Energy Industry Corp.
China National Aero-Technology I/E Corp.
China National Automotive Industry I/E Corp.
Source: Directory Of Chinese Foreign Economic Relations And 
Trade Enterprises (Beijing: China Foreign Economic
Relations and Trade Publishing House, 1987)
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